PHILOSOPHY FOR INDEPENDENT NIGERIA

CONTINUED FROM LAST WEEK

A good many things have happened in Nigeria since October 1, 1960. The first major act of the Government took place on the very day of our independence. It is an act which in my considered judgement detracts very seriously from the sovereignty which was that day conferred upon us. On October 1, 1960, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria (Viscount Head) and the Prime Minister (Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) exchanged correspondence, by means of which an agreement was concluded on that day between Britain and Nigeria. Under this agreement, Nigeria assumes and undertakes all the rights and obligations of Britain under any valid international instruments in so far as they were applicable to Nigeria before the latter’s attainment of independence. These rights and obligations were not spelt out in the correspondence; and in spite of repeated demands by my colleagues and myself, the Federal Government has refused to inform the country of these rights and obligations of Britain which our country assumed and undertook on the day of her independence. Viscount Head, who by the way is generally regarded as the ruler of Nigeria, did once volunteer a public explanation of the agreement in reply to my criticism of it. He said that the agreement was harmless, and that some of the rights and obligations assumed and undertaken by Nigeria under it were those under The Geneva Convention. My own view is that if we would be party to the Geneva Convention, we must do so in our own right as a sovereign state, not as Britain’s underling or foster child.

I have consistently held the view that this agreement is much more dangerous than the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact. Under the Pact (with which I will be dealing briefly later), we know exactly what rights and obligations we have assumed and undertaken. Besides, Nigeria as a nation is directly a party to it. Under the agreement, the obligations which we have undertaken are omnibus and undefined, and what is more, they are all, without exception, Britain’s obligations under any valid international instruments, in so far as they were applicable to us in the days of our subjection.

Now, who is there in the Federal Government, or among Nigerian politicians and intelligentsia as a whole, to tell us with candour and unimpeachable accuracy the number and contents of valid international instruments – both open and secret – to which, in the days before October 1, 1960, Britain had, on behalf of herself and of her territories overseas, committed herself?

The Monrovia Conference has been given a good deal of boosting by the Western Press, and Sir Abubakar has been specially patted on the back for the part he played in it. This is only to be expected. This Conference is known to have been inspired and completely financed by the more important countries of the Western Bloc. Undoubtedly, the Monrovia Conference had been brought into being as a counter-poise to the Cassablanca Powers which do not appear to find favour with the Western Powers and their Press.

But whatever attitude the Western Powers and their Press hold, there are outstanding attributes which the Casablanca Powers posses, but which the Monrovia Powers are still to demonstrate. First, the freedom of each of the countries which constitute the Casablanca Powers is not only legally in existence, but also is being made to be seen in all the country’s doings at home and abroad. Second, the resolutions passed at the Casabanca Conference are positively constructive, and bear the radical stamp of contemporary African nationalism at its best. In order to clinch this second point, I would like to refresh your memories by giving you a summary of some of the resolutions of each of the two groups of Powers. The resolutions of the Casablanca Powers include:

1. The setting up of an African High Command
2. The liquidation of colonial regimes through the liberation of territories still colonised.
3. The elimination of all forms of racial segregation in African States.
4. The consolidation and defence of the sovereignty of New African States.
5. The acceptance of the objective of a political union of Africa, and the taking of such steps as will lead to the early attainment of this objective.
6. The reaffirmation of Africa’s non-alignment to any of the two East and West Blocs.
7. The evacuation of all occupation troops from Africa
8. The barring of Africa to all nuclear experiments.

Those of the Monrovia Powers include:

1. The recognition of absolute equality of sovereignty of all African States irrespective of size and population.
2. Each African state has the right to exist and no African state should try to annex another for any reason.
3. Should any African State desire freely and voluntarily to join with another state no other African States should stand in its way.
4. All States should respect the principle of non-interference in the internal and domestic affairs of any African State.
5. Each State should respect the territorial integrity of another State and should not harbour, within its boundaries, any dissident elements from another State who might wish to use that State as a base for carrying out subversive activities against their own State.
6. Any conception of unity entailing the surrender of sovereignty of any African State to another is totally unrealistic.
7. It will be seen that, apart from the fact that the Monrovia Powers lack the attributes of the Casablanca Powers, the Monrovia resolution are actuated by fear, and place much, too much, emphasis on the minor differences between some African nat